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BACKGROUND 
 
For many years a tension has existed between the law of the European Union governing motor 
vehicle insurance and the UK’s transposition, interpretation and application of its national law. 
Cases including Delaney v Pickett & Tradewise [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 and EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 have demonstrated the UK’s misunderstanding 
of its legal obligations in this area and has led to the award of damages to affected individuals 
against the UK. On 5 December 2016 the Court of Appeal issued its judgment in the case Sahin 
v Havard and Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202. The Court was tasked 
to apply provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to a victim of an unauthorised driver in a 
claim against the policyholder and the insurer. It is argued here that the Court has 
misunderstood and misapplied the EU parent law in its application of national law. The case 
may ultimately be determined by the Supreme Court but it is a ruling of sufficient significance 
in its lack of adherence to EU law and, given the notoriety of cases demonstrating the 
inconsistencies of the Court of Appeal’s decisions in motor vehicle insurance law, it is 
worrying that these judgments seemingly have been ignored. The ruling also has important 
implications for the consequences that Brexit will have on motor vehicle insurance. This is 
particularly if, as is expected, the UK pursues a ‘hard Brexit’ without access to the single 
market and the need to comply with the free movement principles through which the motor 
vehicle insurance directives are based. The UK would therefore be freed of the compatibility 
issues demonstrated in Sahin, but this will likely leave third party victims in a weaker position. 
 
THE FACTS 
 
At 9:30 PM on 24 January 2008 Sahin was travelling along a road when a Vauxhall Vectra 
vehicle collided with his vehicle. Sahin purported that the cause of the accident was the driver 
of the Vauxhall and caused him to suffer loss in respect of the damage to his vehicle and the 
requirement to hire a substitute. The cost of the substitute vehicle exceeded £100,000. The 
driver of the Vauxhall was never identified (and was referred to in the proceedings as X) and 
Havard refused to disclose his details. 
 
Local Contract Hire Leasing Ltd owned the Vauxhall vehicle and had hired it to Havard. The 
policy of insurance covered the hire company as owner and Havard as the person driving the 
car with the permission of the company. Significantly, the policy of motor insurance did not 
cover anyone whom Havard permitted to drive. Indeed, an exclusion clause was included to 
prevent the insurer being responsible for any liability for loss or damage incurred while the 
motor vehicle was being driven by any person not permitted to drive. 
 
It was accepted at appeal that Havard had allowed X to drive the vehicle and he did so without 
insurance cover. Sahin obtained a default judgment against the hire company on 23 July 2009 
but proceedings were discontinued as the company had gone into liquidation. On 31 August 
2011 he began proceedings against Havard on the basis that she had permitted X to drive the 
vehicle without insurance. This action was a breach of the statutory duty imposed by s. 
143(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88), where, following established authority in 
Monk v Warbey,1 Havard had permitted the use of a vehicle on a road without insurance. 
 Sahin obtained a default judgment against Havard on 28 November 2011. Here the insurer of 
the car hire company applied to be joined as second defendant to the proceedings. It argued for 
the default judgment to be set aside. In a hearing of 17 April 2013, DJ Sterlini granted the 
insurer permission to be joined in the proceedings but declined to set aside the default 
judgment. Further, on 20 February 2014, Sahin was granted permission to amend his particulars 
of claim and seek a judgment against the insurer.  
 
At trial, HHJ Baucher identified two questions to be determined as to the imposition of liability 
of the insurer to Sahin. These were:  
 
1)  whether Ms Havard’s liability to Mr Sahin was a liability which was statutorily 
required to be covered pursuant to s. 145 RTA88 which sets out the statutory 
requirements for motor insurance policies; and    
2)  whether Ms Havard’s liability was in fact covered by the terms of the insurance 
policy.2    
 
In dismissing the claim, HHJ Baucher answered both questions in the negative. 1) Section 145 
RTA88 did not require ‘unauthorised use’ to be covered by the insurer; and 2) the terms of the 
insurance policy did not cover the liability. This led to the appeal. It may also be worthy of 
note that this court did not consider the EU dimension to the application of the law. This is not 
atypical and has led the authors to consider potential deficiencies in the legal education and 
training available to students (as future lawyers) and to judges in relation to the interaction 
between national and EU law.3 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The Court had two issues to determine – the first was the application of the statute including 
ss. 143, 145, 148, and 151 of the RTA884 and whether they impose a liability on Havard; and 
secondly, whether the liability on Havard was established through the contract of insurance. 
 
On 30 November 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of HHJ Baucher. Providing 
the unanimous judgment of the court, Longmore LJ considered the obligation imposed in s. 
145 RTA88 which, in defining the scope of cover to third parties, provides that the motor 
vehicle insurance policy must insure Havard in respect of any ‘liability which may be incurred 
by [her]... in respect of... damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of the vehicle 
on a road.’ Here the Court interpreted the word ‘use’ of the vehicle restrictively and this was 
not what had occurred in the circumstances. Havard had given her ‘permission’ to X to drive 
the Vauxhall and that was sufficiently distinct from its ‘use’ to escape the liability imposed in 
s. 145 RTA88. The rationale for this view was in s. 143(1)(b) which did constitute Havard’s 
breach of the RTA88. The statutory liability established in s. 143 RTA88 is widely referred to 
as a Monk v Warbey5 liability because in that case it was first decided that a claimant, injured 
by a vehicle driven by a person permitted to do so by the owner (or insured) and without 
insurance, could recover damages for the loss from that owner (or insured person).  
 
Section 143 RTA88 establishes insurance requirements against third-party risks and that such 
insurance must adhere to minimum standards. Per s.143(1)(a)  
 
‘a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] unless there is 
in force… such a policy of insurance… as complies with the requirements of this part 
of the Act.’6 
 
 Further, s. 143(1)(b) continues 
 
‘a person must not cause or permit any other person to use a motor vehicle on a road 
[or other public place] unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by 
that other person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party 
risks as complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act.’ 
 
The argument presented was that s. 143(1)(b) would be redundant had ‘cause or permit’ be the 
same as ‘use’. This difference led to the consideration of whether a Monk v Warbey7 liability 
should be imposed and required that section to be construed broadly or narrowly. The 
determination would lead to either the application or non-application of s. 151 RTA88 (hence 
was it a liability which an insurer was obliged to satisfy?). 
 
Returning to s. 145 RTA88, there was, argued the Court, no construction required to enable 
‘use’ to include ‘permission to use.’ The applicable EU law, the Second Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directive,8 required insurance to be in place for all persons driving vehicles, whether 
with or without permission. When the national law was viewed holistically, the aims and spirit 
of the directive was achieved. The RTA88 and the Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) agreements9 
enabled third party victims to be compensated for accidents leading to personal and property 
damage.10 Consequently, national law was in compliance with its EU obligations. The 
existence of s. 143 RTA88, and the exclusions permitted in s. 148(2) RTA88, would make any 
attempted interpretation and construction of the word ‘use’ in s. 145 RTA88 to include 
‘permitted use’ contra legem to the RTA88 and would lead to consequences beyond the role 
and power of the Court.11 
 
The Court also returned to the exclusions included in s. 148(2) RTA88. Evidently the most 
common source of action between persons involved in a road traffic accident would be for the 
third party victim to seek compensation through the contractual insurer. On the basis of a 
problem within the contract or contractual relationship, s. 148 RTA88 provides the power to 
modify the contract of insurance. Section 151 RTA88 further statutorily binds the contractual 
insurer to continue with its insurance obligations where it may otherwise seek to avoid 
liability.12 If the previous systems failed to protect the third party victim, s/he may seek to 
recover damages against the MIB which acts as the ‘insurer of last resort’ in instances where 
insurance claims would otherwise not be satisfied (e.g. the driver has no valid/effective 
insurance or an insurer has avoided the contract of insurance). Section 148(2) RTA88 contained 
exclusions (referred to in the statute as ‘matters’) which, if used by an insurer would be held 
as void. The Court, having previously dealt with this same matter in EUI v Bristol Alliance 
Partnership13 (albeit here the Court did not refer to the case) considers the use of the eight 
matters as exhaustive.14 As the contractual insurance policy identified that only Havard was 
covered to drive the vehicle, Havard, in allowing X to drive the car, meant she was not driving 
or using the vehicle ‘with permission’ under the policy. This exclusion clause was not on the 
list of ‘matters’ excluded in s. 148(2) RTA88 and thus Havard’s liability was not covered by 
the policy.15 
 
Ultimately, a Monk v Warbey16 liability did not arise out of ‘use’ of the vehicle by Havard and 
as such this was not required to be covered by s. 145 RTA88. An s. 151 RTA88 liability was 
not imposed on the insurers of the vehicle from any liability / judgment against Havard. 
 
HOPE, BUT DASHED BY THE DISREGARD OF THE COURT OF APPEAL? 
 
It should be noted that following the first instance decision of HHJ Baucher and before the 
Court of Appeal’s ruling on the case, Allen v Mohammed and Allianz Insurance17 was heard at 
Birmingham CC. Here the claimant had been knocked from his bike by a car belonging to the 
first defendant, although the defendant was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 
Similarly to the facts in Sahin,18 the driver, whilst unidentified and uninsured, was driving with 
the defendant’s permission. The claimant was successful in the action against the defendant on 
the basis that Monk v Warbey19 applied and therefore the defendant was in breach of his 
statutory duty and liable for the injuries sustained by the claimant. The claimant then sought to 
join the second defendant insurer in a direct action under reg. 3 of the European Communities 
(Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002 or alternatively under s. 151 RTA88. Again, the 
policy of insurance only covered the first defendant and not someone driving the vehicle with 
her permission, and as a consequence this resulted in a lack of cover by the policy. The claimant 
continued that if the court did not hold the second defendant liable, the MIB should be joined 
as a third defendant. This led to an argument being presented on the basis of the application of 
ss. 151(2)(a) and s. 151(2)(b) RTA88. The provisions of these sections read as follows: 
 
151 Duty of insurers or persons giving security to satisfy judgment against persons 
insured or secured against third-party risks. 
(2) [This section applies] to judgments relating to a liability with respect to any matter 
where liability with respect to that matter is required to be covered by a policy of 
insurance under section 145 of this Act and either— 
 
(a) it is a liability covered by the terms of the policy or security to which the 
certificate relates, and the judgment is obtained against any person who is 
insured by the policy or whose liability is covered by the security, as the case 
may be, or 
(b) it is a liability, other than an excluded liability, which would be so covered 
if the policy insured all persons or, as the case may be, the security covered the 
liability of all persons, and the judgment is obtained against any person other 
than one who is insured by the policy or, as the case may be, whose liability is 
covered by the security. 
 
The claimant argued that if the court held under s. 151(1)(a) RTA88 that the insurer was not 
liable to him under the existing policy, the result would be the claimant was an individual not 
insured for that liability (albeit the first defendant was a policyholder) and liability would fall 
under s. 151(1)(b) RTA88. The insurer argued against this interpretation of s. 151(1)(b) RTA88 
claiming it was not the plain and ordinary meaning of that section of the Act (using the 
definition of insured persons provided in the European Communities (Rights against Insurers) 
Regulations 2002). The court held the 2002 Regulations were not applicable as they required 
proof that the tortfeasor was insured by the defendant. Under the contract of insurance, the first 
defendant was not insured for the liability in question.20  
 
The court then turned its attention to the distinction between ss. 151(1)(a) and 151(1)(b) 
RTA88. It considered that whilst the arguments presented to the effect that s. 151(1)(a) RTA88 
was for policyholders and named drivers, whilst s. 151(1)(b) was for uninsured but identified 
drivers was attractive, this was inconsistent with existing case law. The court was persuaded 
by the reasoning in Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership v Williams21 which focused on the issue 
of liability rather than the driver’s identity. Section 151(2) RTA88 did not use language similar 
to the 2002 Regulations with regards to ‘a person insured under a policy of insurance.’ Such a 
focus on liability was to apply to s. 151(2)(b) RTA88. Ultimately the court held that s. 151 
RTA88 specifically envisaged the insurer becoming accountable under a Monk v Warbey22 
liability as the second defendant would be responsible, yet have an indemnity from the driver 
or the first defendant. Such an interpretation would make the insurer responsible for its 
policyholder rather than just a named uninsured driver they had never heard of. This would 
ensure coherence between s. 151(2) RTA and the MIB agreements, would follow the 
interpretation provided by the CJEU23 and would leave the MIB as the ‘insurer of last resort.’ 
Thus the insurer was held liable for the judgment already provided in favour of the claimant24 
and the findings were in direct contraction to that provided in the first instance Sahin25 
judgment.  
 
The case was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal in its proceedings, yet it did not 
warrant even passing comment by Longmore LJ when providing the unanimous judgment. 
 
MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISSAPLICATION 
 
The arguments presented by the Court continue a series of fundamental misunderstandings of 
the national law, its relationship with the EU parent directives, and the range of obligations 
imposed on the construction and interpretation of national law by cases including Marleasing26 
and Pfeiffer.27 
 
Beginning with the application of the RTA88. The protection of third party victims runs 
throughout the Act and seeks to ensure that either by application of the contract or its 
enforcement through statutory provisions, innocent third party victims have a source of redress. 
Section 148 RTA88 identifies eight areas where attempted exclusions of liability by the insurer 
will be held void and s. 151 RTA88 statutorily binds the contractual insurer to continue with 
its insurance obligations where it may otherwise seek to avoid liability. However, s. 151(2)(a) 
exists to impose a requirement, for protection for the third party, that a contractual liability 
exists and this is applied to a person covered by the policy of insurance. In Sahin,28 the contract 
covered Havard, but did not extend to liabilities caused by ‘unauthorised use.’ Section 
151(2)(b) does prevent the application of exclusions of liability for unauthorized use, but this 
applies where the judgment is made against a person other than the person covered by the 
insurance. Sahin’s first claim and judgment was against Havard who is the policyholder and 
therefore neither s. 151(2)(a) nor s. 151(2)(b) was of any help. As we have seen above, the 
Court of Appeal refused to go beyond the strict literal interpretation of the statute. 
 
Of greater concern is the lack of a willingness on the part of the Court to correctly apply EU 
law and principles. The Second Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive was the applicable law at 
the time and established for member states a requirement that is very clear (the provisions are 
now subsumed into the Sixth Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive). It is included here in its 
entirety: 
 
Article 2 
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any statutory 
provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance policy issued in 
accordance with Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC, which excludes from insurance 
the use or driving of vehicles by: 
- persons who do not have express or implied authorization thereto, or 
- persons who do not hold a licence permitting them to drive the vehicle 
concerned, or 
- persons who are in breach of the statutory technical requirements concerning 
the condition and safety of the vehicle concerned, 
 
shall, for the purposes of Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC, be deemed to be void 
in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an accident. 
 
However the provision or clause referred to in the first indent may be invoked against 
persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury, when 
the insurer can prove that they knew the vehicle was stolen. 
 
There are two elements worth considering here. The first is the instruction to member states 
that statutory provisions or contractual clauses which seek to exclude insurance cover to 
persons lacking authorization to use or drive the vehicle are void in respect of third party 
victims.  
 
Secondly, the only permissible exclusion of cover by an insurer is where the insurer can prove 
(note the responsibility is placed on the insurer)29 the person voluntarily entered the vehicle 
which caused the damage or injury knowing it was stolen. The eight ‘matters’ (exclusion 
clauses) contained in s. 148(2) RTA88 refer to: The age or physical/mental condition of persons 
driving the vehicle; the condition of the vehicle (for example, a car’s illegally worn (bald) 
tyres); the number of persons that the vehicle carries; the weight/physical characteristics of the 
goods which the vehicle carries; the time at which/areas within which a vehicle is used; the 
horsepower/cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; the carrying on the vehicle of particular 
apparatus; or the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other than 
that required by law. This list was held as being exhaustive in EUI v Bristol Alliance 
Partnership30 and therefore any exclusion clause outside of the reach of this list was by its 
nature permissible. Of course, had the Court read the judgment in Bernaldez31 rather than 
simply to rely on the interpretation as provided in EUI,32 along with the consequent series of 
consistent case authority33 following this clarification, it would have recognised the wording 
of the contract providing cover for Havard only would have been void under EU law. Of course, 
member states are required to follow superior EU law and provide a consistent interpretation 
(insofar as this does not extend to contra legem), as articulated in Marleasing.34 This 
requirement developed and subsequently has imposed this binding duty on all the authorities 
of member states (including their courts).35 Further, the CJEU in Pfeiffer36 considered that 
national courts must operate under the presumption that the ‘member state… intended entirely 
to fulfil the obligations arising from the directive concerned.’37 
 
Further, when the Court of Appeal refers to the RTA88 and the MIB working together to fulfil 
the spirit of the EU law and that Sahin could seek a remedy under its Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement,38 this misunderstands the role of the MIB and how it operates with motor vehicle 
insurance. The MIB is the guarantee body established in the UK (among other member states) 
to satisfy insurance claims for the third party of uninsured drivers. The MIB should only ever 
be a source of compensation in that event – where no insurance exists. In Sahin39 the vehicle 
was subject to valid insurance, it is simply that the national law allowed (wrongly) for the 
insurer to escape responsibility. The MIB has no place in these proceedings and for the Court 
to consider otherwise is a profound misunderstanding. 
 
IMPLICATIONS – BREXIT AND BEYOND 
 
The case continues in a series of judgments provided by domestic courts (and in particular the 
Court of Appeal) which appear to not only misunderstand the relationship between national 
and EU law, but steadfastly refuse to engage with the judgments and rationale provided by the 
CJEU. Exclusion clauses provided in contractual insurance policies are restricted to one event 
only ‘persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury, when 
the insurer can prove that they knew the vehicle was stolen.’ Beyond this, it breaches the 
(superior) motor vehicle insurance directives and the line of case authority beginning with 
Bernaldez.40 
 
Turning to the Court of Appeal’s view that the RTA88 and MIB agreements work together to 
‘satisfy both the aim and spirit of the [Motor Vehicle Insurance] directive’ they clearly do not. 
We have, along with other commentators,41 called for a review of the system of motor insurance 
law to provide the certainty needed in the law. RoadPeace has initiated a judicial review42 
against the government for (alleged) breaches of EU law in its transposition of motor vehicle 
insurance law, and this is expected to be heard in January 2017. This may, of itself, lead to a 
review of the national provisions. How this review will progress given the Brexit decision and 
the statement provided by the Prime Minister on 17 January 2017 that the UK intends to leave 
the Single Market (and thereby the fundamental freedoms through which the motor insurance 
directives are a necessary component) will remain to be seen. However, as the intention is for 
a British exit, and the national courts, at least in relation to the law on motor vehicle insurance, 
have often appeared aloof to EU parent laws and to follow a consistent interpretation, it does 
not bode well for progressive and protective rights, especially for the third party victims of 
uninsured drivers and untraced vehicles. 
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